The express companies of the United States — Context and Discussion

From Stage-Drivers to Railroads

The book traces the express industry's evolution from its origins in stagecoach services to a system tightly integrated with railroads. Benedict notes that the express companies "enlarged their activities" as railroads expanded, leading to rapid consolidation. The foreword emphasizes a "vivid, bird's-eye view" of this development, but the excerpts show that the author is less concerned with narrative than with structural change. He highlights how express companies became "integrated with the great railroads," a relationship that shaped their operations and market power. The historical section sets up the central tension: private control versus public utility regulation.

The Parcel Post as Competitor

A key structural argument in the monograph is the competition between private express companies and the government parcel post. Benedict points out that in 1917 the United States had about 55,000 post offices, while express offices numbered roughly 40,000. He argues that consolidation could yield savings, especially since "a large section of the activities of practically every post office is given over to handling packages mailed under the parcel-post." The author suggests that post offices could absorb express business with little added cost, and that existing express offices might serve as overflow capacity. This comparison of infrastructure is central to his case for government ownership.

The Postage Stamp as Efficiency Tool

Benedict devotes a subsection to the postage stamp as a mechanism for reducing overhead. He contends that much of the expense of issuing receipts, making statements, and checking money could be eliminated if express parcels moved under a postage stamp. This is a concrete operational detail: the stamp "can be sold and accepted for payment of charges only by the Post Office Department." The author uses this to illustrate how government control could streamline accounting and reduce administrative costs. The argument is grounded in the specific practices of express companies, which required separate billing and tracking systems.

Estimated Savings and Rate Reductions

The monograph culminates in a quantitative claim: David J. Lewis estimated that government ownership would save at least 40% of total operating expenses. Benedict notes that operating expenses in 1917 represented half of total charges, so a 40% savings would imply a 20% rate reduction, "other things being equal." He then introduces a dynamic factor: lower rates stimulate demand, and each additional unit of business costs less to handle. This reasoning echoes the Interstate Commerce Commission's 1914 order for a 16% rate reduction. The author's reliance on Lewis's authority—Lewis later managed government-controlled telephone and telegraph systems—adds a layer of practical credibility to the estimate.

Benedict's study is best read as a policy argument rooted in operational detail rather than a neutral history. Readers should attend to how he moves between specific cost items—rent, stables, office supplies—and broader claims about efficiency. The monograph's structure, alternating between description and advocacy, reflects its origin as a 10-cent pamphlet published by the Intercollegiate Socialist Society. The evidence is selective but precisely cited, making it a useful document for understanding early twentieth-century debates over public ownership of transportation utilities.