Foreign Exchange — Themes and Context

The Dollar’s Discount as a Rhetorical Lever

Owen’s opening paragraphs do not merely state facts; they marshal numbers as a form of argument. He contrasts the gold-par value of the peseta (19 cents) with its wartime price (28 cents), then translates that into a stark claim: the gold dollar in New York buys only 67 cents’ worth of Spanish currency. The repetition of percentages—50 percent loss, then 100 percent with war prices—creates a cumulative sense of crisis. Owen’s diction is precise but accessible: he speaks of usurious credits and egregious rates, words that carry moral weight. The structure moves from symptom (discount) to cause (private banks and capitalists exploiting demand) to remedy (government action), a pattern that recurs throughout the book. Readers should note how Owen uses the specific case of Spain to generalize: because Spain is an international creditor with no need for dollars, its pesetas are sold at an artificial high price. The logic is forensic, not merely descriptive.

Government Agencies as Characters in the Narrative

Owen populates his argument with a cast of institutional actors: the Federal Reserve Board, the Treasury Department, the War Trade Board, the Shipping Board. Each is assigned a specific role in the remedy. The Treasury Department, for instance, should facilitate placing American securities like Liberty Bonds payable in foreign currencies. The Shipping Board should encourage exports to countries where America owes a trade balance. Owen’s prose treats these agencies almost as protagonists, capable of acting decisively if properly coordinated. He notes that the Secretary of the Treasury is already overburdened—directing railroads, collecting revenues, chairing multiple boards—implying that the current machinery is inadequate. The author’s insider perspective emerges in references to Mr. Fred I. Kent, manager of the credit-transfer department, suggesting Owen expects readers to recognize key figures. This institutional focus gives the book a practical, almost administrative tone, distinct from theoretical economics.

The Arithmetic of War Finance

Owen grounds his argument in large numbers that convey scale without abstraction. He reports that the United Kingdom’s excess imports in 1917 exceeded two billion dollars; France’s, over two billion; Italy’s, over a billion. The combined imports of the four Allied powers topped twelve billion dollars, much of it from neutral countries with favorable trade balances. On these purchases, Owen calculates, the exchange-rate loss probably exceeded a billion dollars. The numbers are not decorative; they serve to justify the urgency of government intervention. Owen’s method is to present a problem, quantify its cost, then propose a mechanism. He does not linger on theory but moves quickly to prescription: the loss can be corrected by intelligent, comprehensive, co-ordinated employment of credits and government power. The repetition of co-ordinated and systematic underscores his belief that the solution is organizational, not financial.

Voice and Audience: The Senator as Explainer

Owen’s authorial voice is that of a public official explaining a technical subject to a non-specialist audience. He addresses American business men, bankers, importers and exporters directly, promising that the problem is not really a difficult one. The tone is pedagogical but impatient: he wants readers to understand so they can support the remedy. His sentences are often long, packed with clauses, yet the logic is linear. He uses the first person sparingly—I desire—but the authority of his position is implicit. The book’s structure reflects its origin as a policy brief: it states a problem, analyzes factors, and proposes a mechanism. Readers should note that Owen does not engage with opposing views or theoretical debates; his aim is persuasion, not scholarship. The excerpts suggest a work that is less a textbook than a manifesto for a specific policy: the creation of a Federal Reserve foreign bank to stabilize the dollar.

Owen’s Foreign Exchange is best read as a primary document of wartime economic policy, not as a timeless guide. Its value lies in the specificity of its examples—the peseta at 28 cents, the lira at 8.90—and in the clarity of its institutional vision. Readers interested in the history of the Federal Reserve or the political economy of World War I will find a concise argument for state intervention in currency markets. The book’s brevity (under 13,000 words) and direct style make it accessible, but its assumptions about government capacity and the benevolence of central control should be weighed against later experience.